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ACOs THROUGH THE EYES OF EVANSTON:
COMPARING COMPETITIVE EFFICIENCIES AND HARMS
OF HOSPITAL MERGERS AND ACO FORMATION
Jacob Harper*
I. INTRODUCTION
The controversial Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act and Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act (collectively referred to as the
Affordable Care Act ("ACA") and colloquially
as "healthcare reform") are now infamous for the
"individual mandate."' While much of the public
focus rests on this hotly contested provision, the
ACA also changes the nation's health care delivery
systems2 in a number of fundamental ways.'
Foremost, this legislation strongly encourages the
implementation of Accountable Care Organizations
("ACOs") through the Medicare Shared Savings
Program.4
ACOs represent the newest iteration of the federal
government's solution to the long-standing problem
of increasing health care costs.' To incentivize
the creation of these organizations, however, the
government had to bend, and in some cases, break
a number of laws affecting health care providers.6
Among these laws are the Sherman, Clayton,
and Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") Acts,
collectively known as antitrust law, which seek
to foster the healthy functioning of markets by
protecting competition and deterring monopolization
by a single firm.7 To effectuate compliance with these
laws, the FTC and the United States Department of
Justice ("DOJ") jointly investigate and prosecute
violations of antitrust law.8
When conducting such investigations, the FTC and
DOJ are often required to weigh the pro-competitive
benefits against the anti-competitive harms of the
firm or merger they are analyzing.9 This type of
analysis generally requires an associated complex
economic analysis and is intensely fact-driven.10 In
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particular, because its members must often share
information about their customers with rivals, the
health care industry has faced long-standing antitrust
scrutiny from the FTC and DOJ over concerns of
coordinated economic activity.1' Such scrutiny is
only furthered by government mandates for health
care entities to ensure continuity of care for their
patients.12 As rivals work ever more closely together,
the opportunity for and likelihood of collusion
rises. 13
In evaluating pro-competitive efficiencies, the FTC
may come to a sharp divide between the creation
of ACOs and more traditional hospital mergers.14
ACOs, in part because of their strictly regulated
structure and less formal integration in business
operations of their member organizations (i.e.
each provider retains their separate legal identity
in the ACO structure), will likely have striking
pro-competitive benefits with only limited risks.' 5
Conversely, hospital mergers, as the FTC has borne
witness, often lead to higher prices with few lasting
increases in efficiency.16 As a result, mergers among
hospitals have often been rejected or modified by the
FTC to address these concerns.' 7
This comment will critically examine the various
analyses used by the FTC and DOJ in assessing
coordinated efforts by health care entities, and
compare the pro-competitive efficiencies and anti-
competitive harms of hospital mergers with those of
ACOs. Part II discusses the history and structure of
ACOs, as well as the laws, regulations, and guidelines
that the FTC and DOJ may use in conducting
antitrust analysis. Part III explores both the merit
and the weight of harms and efficiencies present in
hospital merger and ACO antitrust analysis. Part IV
recommends possible solutions health care entities
may consider to reduce exposure to antitrust suit
while still maintaining a competitive business model.
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Finally, Part V finds that ACOs, while certainly not
perfect, may be an effective organizational structure
from an antitrust perspective.
II. HISTORY OF THE ACO PROGRAM
AND RELEVANT LAWS AND GUIDANCE
AFFECTING ACOS
A. Organizational Differences Between Hospitals
and ACOs
Technically, an ACO is a "meta-organization"
comprised of multiple hospitals and health care
providers.18 However, it could be set up without a
hospital, but because of the massive upfront capital
required, few providers have sufficient reserves to
finance the start-up costs.19 Some analysts predict
that a single hospital or health system could create
an ACO, and either contract with or directly employ
the physicians and other providers needed to make
the entity function. 20
In terms of size, hospitals are for the most part
unrestricted and can vary greatly.2 1 ACOs, on the
other hand, must agree to provide comprehensive
health services to at least 5,000 beneficiaries for at
least three years.22 Thus, a small practice group or
a small specialty hospital may be unable to meet
the requirements for the provision of a full range of
service, or may not be able to treat that number of
individuals. 23 Therefore, physicians and hospitals are
forced to work together to meet the ACO conditions
of participation. 24
As ACO health care providers begin to coordinate
care and other practice operations, such as billing,
administration and compliance, more fully, the
ACO is anticipated to achieve an unheralded level
of vertical integration. 25 In an ACO, primary care
physicians, specialists, hospitalists, therapists, and
home health providers would all function together
to enhance continuity of care to beneficiaries. 26
Vertically integrated ACOs would likely have
hospitals that could offer a full range of care -
primary, secondary, and tertiary services. 27
However, by themselves, hospitals only achieve
modest vertical integration, because they are
restricted through antitrust laws from achieving full
integration. 28 Hospitals can contract with and employ
physicians and practice groups, employ hospital
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staff, and purchase supplies and equipment.2 9 There
are limits on physician involvement, joint purchasing
of supplies, and joint ventures on expensive
equipment.3 0 Moreover, the exchange of patient
data, pricing, and cost report information among a
hospital or hospitals and providers is challenging. 31
An ACO, conversely, must share cost, pricing, and
patient information, among its member providers
and hospitals. 32
Hospitals generally obtain revenue from three
sources: Medicare and Medicaid payments; private
insurance payments; and, to a lesser degree,
copayments and deductibles received from individual
patients.33 Hospitals cannot easily negotiate with
Medicare and Medicaid for changes in payment
rates, and any desired changes must be completed
through roundabout lobbying efforts, not standard
buyer-seller negotiations. 34 As such, a hospital's
main buyer is private insurers, usually managed care
organizations ("MCOs"), and hospitals negotiate
with these private insurers." Through negotiations
with MCOs, hospitals receive either a per diem rate
or a fee for each service performed ("fee-for-service"
or "FFS"), which hospitals generally prefer.36 Health
care providers, as well, are almost always paid under
an FFS system.37
As part of an ACO, hospitals and health care
providers still receive FFS payments, but can also
receive payments under the Medicare Shared
Savings program.38 While these entities are new,
MCOs are also looking to contract with ACOs under
terms similar to those set out under the Medicare
program.39
Hospital mergers consist of identification of a
potential acquisition, a series of negotiations with
the target regarding price and other factors (i.e.
religious directives, indemnities, medical staff
relations) and due diligence reviews. of the risks
and rewards a merger could bring.40 In addition,
any substantial mergers must be reviewed pursuant
to the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements
Act of 1976 ("HSR") by the FTC and DOJ.4 1 Even
so, most mergers reported pursuant to HSR do not
undergo serious investigation. 42 Overall, while a
merger could cost millions depending on whether
the government challenges, this process is generally
less expensive than the formation of an ACO.4 3
Health Law & Policy Brief
Providers must consider several cost factors
when forming an ACO, including administrative,
actuarial, compliance and legal costs, and time spent
interacting with and submitting an application to the
government(which must be approved by the FTC)."
Moreover, ACOs must also ensure participating
providers perform their respective duties to the
ACO and to the assigned beneficiaries, and consider
the resultant risks, both financial and reputational,
associated with the factors laid out above. 45 While
the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
("CMS") has estimated start-up costs for an ACO to
be $1.8 million, the American Hospital Association,
in an independent study, estimated that "the costs of
the necessary elements to successfully manage the
care of a defined population is considerably higher -
$11.6 to $26.1 million . . . ."46
B. Relevant Laws Affecting ACOs
To understand the current antitrust issues surrounding
ACOs, it is necessary to examine the intersection of
health care and antitrust law in the United States.
1. Health Care Laws and Guidance
a. The Social Security Act
The period of heavy governmental regulation of the
health care industry began in the mid- 1960's with the
passage of the Social Security Amendments of 1965
("SSA") during the Lyndon Johnson administration. 47
In expanding programs for Social Security, the SSA
created the Medicare and Medicaid programs. 48
These programs were intended to subsidize most, if
not all, healthcare costs of the elderly (65 and older),
disabled, and poor.49
Medicare was initially divided into two parts: Part
A, which covered inpatient and hospital procedures
and treatment; and Part B which covered outpatient
and physician services, but required a premium
and deductible."o While the Medicare program was
considered a success in terms of its benefit to society,
appropriations for the law quickly accelerated to
meet increasing demand for government-subsidized
health services.5 1
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b. Health Maintenance Organization Act
By the mid-1970's, the federal government,
recognizing the costs associated with federal health
care programs, passed the Health Maintenance
Organization Act of 1973 ("HMOA") as a cost-
containment measure.52 HMOA, in seeking to
provide better integration of health care services and
avoid duplication of effort by encouraging health care
entities to provide most of a patient's care for a flat
fee, paved the way for managed care organizations
("MCOs"). 53 In return, insurers incentivized patients
to remain in the care of one or a few predetermined
providers through lower "in-network" costs.54
Unfortunately, this legislation could not stem the tide
of growth in health care spending.55
c. The Affordable Care Act
Witnessing these rising costs and other problems in
the health care industry, legislators and the Obama
administration passed health care reform in 2010,
which set the stage for the rise of ACOs. 56 These
laws represented the most sweeping changes to
Medicare and Medicaid since the creation of these
programs in 1965.57
ACA established the Medicare Shared Savings
Program, which mandated the establishment of a
methodology and controlling rules for the formation,
payment, and regulation of ACOs. 8 Importantly,
the Medicare Shared Savings Program called for
the suspension of enforcement or limitation on
enforcement of a number of laws affecting health
care providers. These laws include the Stark law,
Anti-Kickback Statute, and the Sherman and
Clayton Acts. These laws generally prohibit improper
financial relationships and coordination between
health care providers, prohibitions which the federal
government believes may limit over-utilization
of services, medically unnecessary services and
ultimately harm to patients. 59
Designers of the program anticipate that ACOs
will increase vertical integration in patient care,
creating better coordination and efficiency among
providers, while simultaneously disincentivizing
over-utilization. 60 By forcing providers to reduce
redundancy in medical tests and procedures, the
government hopes to gain substantial savings in
the Medicare program. As part of the ACO design,
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participating providers will receive a portion of
those savings (assuming they meet a host of quality
benchmark requirements). 6 1
2. Antitrust Laws and Guidance
a. The Sherman Act
In the late 19th century, several industries in the
United States, such as oil and steel production,
became heavily concentrated, allowing dominant
operators to exercise considerable monopolistic
powers, including decreasing output of goods and
increasing prices to socially undesirable levels. 62
Moreover, industries were forming trusts, whereby
executives of industry-leading firms would
coordinate their activities and compel shareholders
to put their shares in a large industry trust.63 Once
there, the leadership was able to coordinate all
industry activity through operation of the trust,
leading to significant anti-competitive effects. 64
At this point, the federal government stepped in,
enacting the Sherman Antitrust Act ("Sherman Act")
in 1890.65 Recognizing the negative impact that
trusts and monopolies were having on consumers,
the federal government, through the Sherman Act,
outlawed "every contract, combination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce.. . ."66 Moreover, it declared that
"every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other
person or persons, to monopolize any part of.. . the
trade or commerce" would be guilty of a felony.67
But because this language is overly broad and could
be interpreted as restricting nearly every contract in
existence, significant judicial interpretation of the
law was required.68
b. Clayton Act
Despite the broad provisions of the Sherman Act,69
it had difficulty rooting out anti-competitive activity
of a single firm, since the law generally required an
agreement or coordination of activity.70 Moreover,
sophisticated business executives could get around
the laws through tacit agreements and other activities
that the Sherman Act could not legally reach.7 1 To
overcome these situations, the federal legislature
enacted the Clayton Antitrust Act in 1914.72
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This Act made substantive additions to and revisions
of the Sherman Act.73 Not only did this Act seek
to ban certain unilateral activities, it also extended
the competition laws to potentially anti-competitive
actions before they could influence price or output.74
As the Act sets out, mergers may be illegal if "in
any line of commerce or in any activity affecting
commerce in any section of the country, the effect of
such acquisition [or merger] may be substantially to
lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly."'75
Importantly, the Clayton Act identified and made
illegal activities such as price discrimination between
different purchasers, tying arrangements, exclusive
dealing arrangements, and mergers and acquisitions
that may significantly reduce competition.7 6 With
the passage of the Clayton Act, anti-competitive
outcomes did not need to be shown - instead, the
federal government could point to factors such as
market concentration to infer that anti-competitive
effects existed or were likely to exist.77 The Clayton
Act significantly broadened the scope of antitrust
enforcement authority.78
c. Federal Trade Commission Act
Simultaneous to the passage of the Clayton Act,
the Wilson administration created the Federal
Trade Commission Act ("FTC Act"). 79 The FTC
Act established the FTC as the authoritative body
on assessing business and competition practices
of corporations and other entities. 0 Tasked with
enforcing the competition laws of the United States,
the FTC was granted authority to investigate trade
practices and act on its findings in order to preserve
competition.8'
d. FTC/DOJ Merger Guidelines
Recognizing that health care is a complex and
unique area of commerce, the FTC and DOJ have
jointly issued various statements and guidelines on
their antitrust enforcement policies. 82 Moreover,
these statements have been widely adopted and cited
by the judiciary.83
For over forty-four years, DOJ has published a set of
merger guidelines and enforcement policies.8 4 First
issued in 1968, these guidelines were significantly
revised in 1982 and 1984.85 Currently, however, only
the 1984 amendments regarding vertical mergers
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are still in effect. The FTC and DOJ jointly issued
a comprehensive set of merger guidelines in 1992
("Merger Guidelines") heavily focused on horizontal
integration.86 The Merger Guidelines outlined the
FTC's enforcement policy and analytical techniques
used when evaluating potentially anti-competitive
mergers and acquisitions.87 The Merger Guidelines
were revised in 1997 and reworked again in 2010.8
e. Commentary to the Merger Guidelines
In addition to the guidance set out in the Merger
Guidelines, commentary to the Merger Guidelines
was issued in 2006.89 This document was based on the
ongoing experiential learning by the FTC and DOJ,
as well as the changes occurring in the United States
business climate throughout the past few decades. 90
While these Merger Guidelines do not apply to
vertical mergers, an aspect of ACO integration
which will not be explored in this comment, they do
apply to horizontal agreements concerning rivals or
potential rivals, which, in the case of ACOs, would
be providers to providers or hospitals to hospitals.91
f. Statement on ACO Antitrust Enforcement
In 2011, the FTC and DOJ issued a Statement
("Statement") on the anticipated methodology for
evaluating the propriety of a proposed or existing
ACO, and whether the ACO could cause anti-
competitive harms. 92 The Statement first sets out
a safety zone in which the FTC and DOJ would
likely not pursue enforcement against an ACO
and a methodology for calculating such zone.93 It
further identified two exceptions for ACOs that fall
outside of the safety zone, but may otherwise be
sheltered from antitrust enforcement by the federal
government.94 Finally, the Statement details how
ACOs that fall outside of the safety zone and do not
qualify for an exception will be subject to a "rule of
reason" analysis. 95
C. In the Matter of Evanston Northwestern
Healthcare Corp. -An Instructive Case in
Hospital Merger Analysis
While the FTC and DOJ have long scrutinized
mergers among hospitals, these organizations
have expressly condoned the formation of ACOs
and have issued specific guidance on how their
antitrust analyses concerning these entities will
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be conducted.9 6 To illustrate the potential benefits
and harms that each type of entity could cause to
competition, this comment examines the case of In
the Matter of Evanston Northwestern Healthcare
Corp.97 This case was an administrative matter
based on an FTC complaint against a Chicago-area
hospital chain which had merged with a local rival.98
The comment first analyzes the outcome of Evanston
based on the five-part test set out by the FTC in the
decision, noting elements and factors important to
the Agency. Then, the comment uses these factors as
a basis for analyzing ACOs under the FTC's rule of
reason analysis.
1. Relevant Facts ofEvanston
In Evanston, a small hospital chain merged with a
local rival hospital and prices at these hospitals soon
rose .99 As a result of this and a recent additional
acquisition, Evanston Northwestern Healthcare
Corporation ("ENH") currently exists as a three-
hospital chain in the suburbs of northern Chicago. 00
As of the Evanston case, the chain was composed
of three hospitals: Evanston Hospital (400 beds),
Glenbrook Hospital (125 beds) and Highland Park
Hospital (200 beds).101 These hospitals all provide
varying levels of care, but all offer secondary care,
and in some cases tertiary care. 102 In addition, there
are at least one hundred hospitals serving the Chicago
area, with nine hospitals located within fifteen miles
of the ENH hospitals in question.'03 Nevertheless,
the geographic triangle made up by these three
hospitals did not contain any other hospitals.104
In 1999 and 2000, Highland Park executives agreed
to merge Highland Park Hospital with ENH.10 As a
result of the merger, ENH was almost immediately
able to leverage its regional market power to raise
prices paid by private insurers, MCOs.106
When patients are treated by a health care entity that
contracts with an MCO, the MCO generally pays the
majority of the charges incurred. 0 7 The patient and
other insured individuals in the patient's pool, through
insurance policy premiums, fund the payor to make
such payments. 08 In addition, a patient generally
pays a deductible and copayment or coinsurance
directly to the hospital. 109 Nevertheless, the majority
of payment received by the hospital treating such a
patient is determined through negotiated contracting
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between the MCO and the hospital.I 0 As a hospital's
market share rises, an MCO servicing patients in that
hospital's area may more likely need the hospital's
services to meet its customer demands, and the
payors are thus forced to agree to higher charges.'''
In Evanston, Evanston and Glenbrook Hospitals had
directly competed pre-merger against Highland Park
Hospital for contracts with private , using separate
negotiating teams and unaware of bids, discounts and
pricing information that the other was offering.112
Post-merger, the informational and negotiating
objectives of the combined entity aligned, and ENH
used this enhance leverage to command higher
prices from MCOs.113
In 1998, Evanston and Glenbrook collectively
brought in $441 million, fifty one percent of which
was from private payors.114 Similarly, Highland Park
generated $101 million in 1998. Of this, forty five
percent came from private MCOs."l5
In 2004, the FTC brought a complaint against the
merged entity, alleging that the merger had violated
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits
mergers and acquisitions that tend to substantially
lessen competition.' 16 Both the FTC itself and an
administrative law judge ("ALJ") considering the
case found that this merger had indeed violated the
law.'' 7
While the ALJ mandated divestment of the Highland
Park Hospital from ENH (in other words, that
Highland Park return to its pre-merger position and all
ownership and other functions be legally separated),
the FTC tacitly recognized that efficiencies existed
and held that total divestment was an undue burden
on the entity, which had operated all three hospitals
for seven years before divestment was mandated."'
Considering this fact, the FTC ordered that ENH
form two independent and uncoordinated MCO
negotiating teams, one for Highland Park and the
other for Evanston and Glenbrook, in order to restore
the competition lost by this merger. '1
III. A COMPARISON OF ACO FORMATION
AND HOSPITAL MERGERS -
ANTICIPATED EFFECTS AND HARMS
A. Mergers Under the Theory of Unilateral
Adverse Effects
When assessing the propriety of a horizontal merger,
the FTC uses a five part analytical framework as set
out in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines. 20 These
parts include:
1. defining a relevant market and evaluating
market concentration;
2. identifying and weighing potentially adverse
effects;
3. determining the ease of entry into the market
and whether such possible entry would
counteract the adverse effects identified;
4. determining and weighing any pro-competitive
effects; and
5. determining whether one of the merging firms
qualifies as failing.121
Due to provisions of HSR, proposed mergers of any
substantial weight must be evaluated prospectively
by the FTC or DOJ before consummation of the
merger.122 While Evanston was considered long
after a merger had already taken place, the analysis
involved is consistent with the framework outlined
above, and in fact can be more elucidating, since the
results of the merger are evident.123
1. Defining a Market
Perhaps the most critical step in conducting antitrust
review ofa merger is in defining the relevant market
for which market power will then be calculated.124 In
turn, market definition is divided into a two-pronged
analysis: identifying the relevant geographic market
and determining the appropriate product market.125
To arrive at a legitimate geographic market, the
FTC's Merger Guidelines analyze whether a
hypothetical monopolist could "profitably impose
at least a 'small but significant and nontransitory'
increase in price ("SSNIP"), holding constant the
terms of sale for all products produced elsewhere,"
in a given geographical region.126
42
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This analytical framework, however, leaves much
to be litigated, and reasonable experts can disagree
on just how such an area may be defined. 12 7 In
Evanston, the FTC asserted that the relevant market
consisted of the triangle formed by the three hospitals
in question. 128 Conversely, ENH stated that the
market consisted of these three hospitals and several
additional hospitals contained in a north-south axis
of thirty-six miles.129
While the AU essentially split the parties'
disagreement and defined the market as the ENH
hospitals and several other hospitals within a close
vicinity, the FTC rejected the AL's holding.130
Instead, because this case was decided post-merger,
the FTC had actual evidence of a price increase
within the geographic area made up by the ENH
hospitals.13' Circularly, the relevant market was
defined by where price increases occurred in that
location.132 Nevertheless, the FTC identified three
factors that could be used to assist in defining a
geographic market, to wit: population density, traffic
patterns, and socio-economic factors. 3 3
Product market definition is similarly based on
the SSNIP of a hypothetical monopolist, but is
chiefly concerned with what substitutes exist for
a product that the merged firms are selling.134 The
FTC generally considers an SSNIP of five percent
to demonstrate harm to competition, but is quick
to acknowledge that this number may be higher or
lower depending on the facts of each matter.135
In Evanston, the parties debated whether the product
market should consist of only acute inpatient care or
include outpatient procedures as well. 136 The FTC
agreed with the ALJ that the relevant market was
solely for inpatient care, and established a number of
factors used to resolve the argument.'37 For instance,
ENH executives testifying to the fact that the pricing
for outpatient services was made independent of
pricing for inpatient services, and without regard
for whether consumers "would switch to outpatient
services."l38 This lack of a corollary demand implied
a low cross-elasticity.139
Other issues, too, were damning to ENH's position.
The hospital's buyers, MCOs, testified that they
could not substitute inpatient services and outpatient
services.140 Furthermore, multiple courts had long
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held that inpatient services constituted a definitive
product market, such that the FTC would have had
to severely upset precedent to include outpatient
services.14' Finally, the facts show that even the
inclusion of outpatient services in the economic
analysis "would not alter the outcome of this case." 42
With the relevant markets defined specifically along
the lines the FTC had first envisioned, the analysis
moved to the second step in the merger framework.143
2. Anti-competitive Effects
The step of identifying anti-competitive effects is
perhaps the easiest, particularly when evaluating
already-consummated mergers." In Evanston,
the FTC and the ALJ readily concluded that the
price of inpatient services at ENH had gone up
substantially.145 The theory behind this price increase
was one of unilateral effects.146
In a perfectly competitive scenario, two competing
firms do not have access to the exact same resources
or information necessary to leverage themselves
in the marketplace, since each firm acts as a check
on the monopolistic tendencies of the other.147
Moreover, buyers can substitute the goods of these
two firms based on need and preference if one is
engaging in anti-competitive practices, assuming the
other can sufficiently increase output to meet market
demand.148 As a result, the firms tend to remain at
competitive levels of price and output.149
However, when these firms merge, buyers are left
with no other option or, if there are other firms in
the market, less attractive options in terms of the
products they seek.' The merged firm has two
methods to control price.151 First, it may leverage its
dominant position against buyers to create a "take-it-
or-leave-it" situation, where consumers' only option
is to pay higher prices for products.' 5 2 While other
firms may counteract this effect, they may not be a
first or second preference for consumers because of
higher costs or lower quality.' As a result, buyers
are harmed.15 4
Second, through merger, the firms at issue align both
their goals and their informational resources. 5 This
coordinated alignment adds to their leverage against
buyers because they now know the prices that each
other's former buyers were previously willing to
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pay.156 Moreover, the goals of the prior firms were
each to make profit for themselves to the detriment
of the competing firm. 157 Now, these united firms
seek to make profit for the same set of owners, and
therefore coordinate their marketing and negotiating
strategies to achieve this goal.Iss
Evanston defendants, likewise, coordinated their
negotiation efforts with private payors, and actively
forced higher prices to be paid by MCOs for the
health services at issue.159 As their representatives
testified, the MCOs had no other available options
than to provide coverage from one of these hospitals
for their policyholders in the region.160
3. Ease of Entry
The Merger Guidelines call for an assessment of
whether potential rivals could enter into a market
if the merged firms engaged in anti-competitive
practices.161 Under the Merger Guidelines at the
time of the case, entry by potential rivals must be
likely enough in a two-year period to conclude
that a merger's anti-competitive effects may be
counteracted.162
In pre-merger analysis, the FTC examines the
applicable barriers to entry, which may include:
regulations and zoning, the possibility of predatory
pricing, licensure and certification requirements,
time, start-up capital, sophistication, intellectual
property, and sunk costs.' 63 Both the FTC and the
ALJ in Evanston found that new entry would be
unlikely to offset the harms caused by the ENH
merger. I" This determination was based primarily
on the fact that no new hospitals had been built in
the area, and that entry took a substantial amount of
time and start-up capital, thereby making entry into
this market substantially unlikely.165
4. Pro-competitive Efficiencies
Alternatively, pro-competitive effects may be used to
balance out the anti-competitive harms of a merger.166
These effects may consist of a variety ofjustifications,
including enhanced administrative efficiencies,
economies of scale, quality improvements, the ability
to provide new product lines, other innovations, and
increased financial strength in one or both of the
merged firms.167 Nevertheless, these efficiencies
must be demonstrably strong in order to rebut the
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presumption of anti-competitive effects from an
increase in price or showing of significant market
power.'68
Nearly every defendant argues that a merger will
create significant administrative efficiencies and
can cut costs.169 Because the firms no longer need
to duplicate their efforts in terms of administrative
functions, human resources oversight and marketing
efforts, the firms can function with essentially a
single set of these professionals.' 70 Still, it was
difficult for ENH to tie the cost-cutting efficiencies
to a restraint in price increases or other competitive
benefit. '' But in simply making itself stronger, ENH
ignored that antitrust law is, at its heart, intended to
protect competition, not the competitors.172
Economies of scale may demonstrate a rational
basis for approving an otherwise anti-competitive
merger.17 1 These economies of scale efficiencies are
achieved by stronger purchasing abilities, financial
benefits, such as obtaining lower interest rates, and
technological advantages of increasing returns to
scale, whereby a firm's infrastructure and production
investments lower the cost of each unit produced.174
For instance, a hospital may invest, as ENH did
here, in an electronic medical records system that
seamlessly interacts with all departments of the
hospital (or hospitals), allowing patients to be treated
more thoroughly, precisely and quickly. 75 These
economies of scale, however, have high upfront
costs, and cannot usually be achieved by smaller
firms with less capital.176
Economies of scale tend to be a compelling pro-
competitive rationale, as they are typically related
to quality improvements and innovation.177
Although antitrust law views an increase in price
with significant scrutiny, it is cognizant of the fact
that many products are only developed through the
efforts of maj or firms or through coordination among
lesser firms.178 Therefore, although dense market
concentration is considered problematic, firms that
can significantly increase the quality of an existing
product or innovate to create new products may be
able to point to these countervailing efficiencies
when accused of a violation.17 9
Nevertheless, the "least restrictive alternative"
rule tends to weaken the pro-competitive power of
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innovation and quality improvements.s18 This theory
holds that antitrust violations will only be excused
when there is no less restrictive alternative available
to achieve the efficiencies claimed.181 In other words,
if two entities could have formed a joint venture or
other semi-coordinated entity to develop or enhance
the goods offered instead of merging, the FTC and
courts may still find a violation of antitrust law.182
In Evanston, for instance, ENH claimed that it
significantly improved the quality of care at the
Highland Park location, proffering a $120 million
investment and expansion over sixteen service
areas." The FTC, conversely, set out a three-
pronged test to determine whether such quality
improvements should be considered. 184 This test
requires that the efficiencies claimed be verifiable,
merger-specific, and greater than the merger's anti-
competitive effects. 185 Initially, the FTC noted that
although ENH had invested funds towards quality
improvements, there were no facts demonstrating
that actual quality had been improved.186
Next, the FTC determined that the claimed benefits
were not merger-specific, and could have been
achieved by less restrictive means.187 In fact, the
agency found that Highland Park Hospital already
had devoted $100 million to improve quality at the
hospital before the merger, covering most of the
same areas claimed by ENH, and had a plan in place
to effectively finance these improvements.' While
ENH argued that these improvements specifically
required ENH management's skill, the FTC was
unpersuaded that Highland Park could not have
reasonably made the improvements on its own.189
As a result, the merger efficiencies failed to meet
the "least restrictive alternative" theory and failed to
meet the second prong of the test set out above.190
Notwithstanding the fact that these efficiencies were
neither verified nor merger-specific, the FTC also
held that ENH did not produce substantial evidence
that these alleged benefits outweighed the concrete
anti-competitive harms.'91
5. Failing Firms
The Merger Guidelines do allow for an otherwise
illegal merger to be approved if one firm is acquiring
a firm that is imminently failing.' 92 The Guidelines,
nevertheless, require three specific criteria for this
defense to be established.'93 These are:
1. the failing firm must be unable to meet its
financial obligations in the short term;
2. this firm must not be able to reorganize
and survive under Chapter 11 bankruptcy
protection; and
3. the firm must have failed in making good-faith
efforts to obtain an offer of acquisition that
would allow its assets to remain in the relevant
market. 194
While Highland Park was considered a "weak"
hospital in Evanston, it did not come close to meeting
the applicable criteria, and such criteria can only be
met in the most limited of instances.195 As a result,
the FTC flatly rejected this argument.196
B. ACO Antitrust Framework
The FTC has not yet demonstrated exactly how
ACO antitrust analysis will commence, but has
noted that any evaluations will be conducted under
the rule of reason. 197 The rule of reason takes into
consideration all of the relevant pro-competitive and
anti-competitive effects when assessing the propriety
of a proposed ACO formation.198
Considering the case of Evanston as if the hospitals
had merely set up an ACO rather than engaged in
a full merger, many aspects of the analysis remain
the same. For instance, the product market and
geographical market determination would be the
same or similar.199 The "failing firms" issue would be
unlikely to arise, since the ACO does not necessarily
have any "assets" other than skill of administrative
personnel, which would not be lost to the market if
the ACO exited.
Assessing the ease of entry does not yield a clear
result. Although an ACO does not need to build an
extensive physical plant and instead uses hospitals
and providers already in a market, ACO formation
requires time and significant capital investments. 200
Further, considering the limited supply of doctors
and hospitals interested in joining an ACO, entry into




Conversely, it may be harder for the FTC to establish
a compelling theory of competitive harms when
assessing a potential ACO. 201 Due to the lack of full
integration among ACO member-hospitals, such as
coordinated negotiating teams, ACOs will probably
not be able to exert the same degree of competitive
pressure as merged hospitals. 20 2 Nevertheless, the
same anti-competitive risks exist, particularly with
regard to price fixing, since all participants in the
ACO will generally know the fees and costs of their
rivals and can therefore more easily collude.203
However, while informational effects could arise, the
collusion of ACO member-hospitals in private payor
negotiation is mitigated by their inability to fully
leverage their position against MCOs, though such
effect could exist if the ACO contracted universally
with MCOs on behalf of its members. 204
The most important differences in ACO formation
analysis are in the pro-competitive efficiencies an
ACO may realize. These include significant cost-
cutting and the implementation of quality metrics.205
Moreover, many believe that the ACO, if it functions
correctly, serves as an innovative new product in and
of itself. By providing an unprecedented continuum
of care, increasingly positive health outcomes may
be realized.206 Patients are given preventative care,
seen by hospitalists for emergencies and followed
up by home health agencies that already know and
understand each patient's unique medical history and
care requirements. 207 Because of such coordination,
fewer services, such as diagnostic tests or hospital
readmissions, need to be performed, saving
substantial amounts of federal Medicare money.
Furthermore, because of compliance and quality
requirements, each ACO member will likely become
a stronger, more viable competitor in its respective
market. 208 Such positive effects will likely outweigh
any associated rises in costs to private payors.
IV. WHAT SHOULD HOSPITAL
ADMINISTRATORS DO TO AVOID
OR LIMIT POSSIBLE ANTITRUST
ALLEGATIONS
In general, antitrust analysis is a complex, fact-
intensive undertaking and can have significant
ramifications for hospitals and health care entities
of any size.209 Indeed, ENH, similarly sized to many
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nearby hospitals, unsuccessfully argued that these
hospitals were competitors. As a result, hospital
administrators should consider a variety of options
when identifying potential growth and business
opportunities. While ACOs may be arduous to set
up, they represent a striking option from an antitrust
perspective. 210
Importantly, ACOs do not have the same type of
integration as a traditional hospital merger. Unlike
merged hospitals, one hospital under an ACO
umbrella does not own or otherwise control the
activities of another hospital in the ACO. Moreover,
cost-containment measures such as reduction in
administrative staff cannot be readily achieved.
Finally, participation in the Shared Saving Program
places a number of compliance burdens on ACO
members they would not otherwise have to face.2 11
Nevertheless, ACOs tend to allow two important
coordinated activities: first, knowledge and possible
sharing of each member's private payor rates and
negotiating postures, and second, the potential
leverage of private payors through unilateral "take-
it-or-leave-it" effects. In essence, ACOs may be able
to achieve many of the same bargaining outcomes as
member hospitals if they simply merged, particularly
if the ACO negotiates with MCOs on behalf of all
members. While the legality of these coordinated
efforts may be debatable, the FTC and DOJ analysis
is anticipated to be far more favorable to ACOs than
to traditional hospital mergers. Moreover, ACOs
have been expressly encouraged by lawmakers and
administrative agencies alike, suggesting that the
FTC and DOJ may be more receptive to arguments
about efficiencies, cost-containment and other pro-
competitive effects.
In addition, ACOs may also receive the benefit
of involvement in the Medicare Shared Savings
Program. For instance, Highland Park Hospital
generated $101 million in 1998, of which forty
three percent ($43.43 million) was derived from
Medicare and Medicaid programs.2 12 Assuming that
an ACO participated in the two-sided risk-sharing
model, the ACO would be eligible to receive up
to sixty percent of the savings realized.213 While
actual revenue amounts would drop to achieve such
savings, associated costs incurred to generate those
additional revenues would also disappear. As a
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result, it is likely that significant cost cutting could
result in profits for the ACO. This, of course, is in
addition to the possible rise in private payor rates as
a result of greater information flows between ACO
member entities.
ACO formation, however, may not be well-suited
for every hospital wishing to expand its business
operations. First and foremost, nothing truly takes
the place of a traditional merger or acquisition in
terms of an administrator's ability to operate multiple
facilities and expand its practices. 214 Furthermore,
ACOs as a health care delivery model are untested
and represent significant upfront costs that many
hospitals, particularly more rural hospitals, may be
unable or unwilling to pay. Finally, participation in
the ACO program requires a health care entity to
meet significant quality benchmarks and reporting
requirements. In other words, ACOs act as a
guarantor of the health of the beneficiaries they are
assigned, but their patients, conversely, are free to go
elsewhere to receive treatment. Any negative health
outcomes, however, may affect the ACO's payment or
participation status. 215 For these reasons, a hospital
administrator considering merger or ACO formation
must think critically about the issues involved and
weigh the corresponding risks and rewards for each
option.
V. CONCLUSION
Antitrust analysis by the FTC, DOJ and federal
courts will differ between hospital mergers and ACO
formation. 216 While merging hospitals may be unable
to offer substantial pro-competitive justifications for
a rise in private payor costs, ACOs receive both a
more favorable analytical framework and by their
nature have significant efficiencies, effects which
have been both recognized and developed by the
federal government. This beneficial analysis, almost
a "benefit-of-the-doubt", given to ACOs should serve
as an additional incentive for hospital organizations
to consider formation of this type of entity.
Admittedly, a host of criticism and functional
difficulties still surround ACOs, but as improvements
are made to the regulatory framework and experiential
knowledge about ACO operation is gathered, these
types of entities will become more viable. Hospital
and health system executives should keep these
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entities in mind when determining business strategy
and future organizational opportunities.
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